Asean must watch the rise of the Arakan Army in Myanmar further — Phar Kim Beng

JUNE 25 — For much of the past five years, Asean has understandably focused on Myanmar’s military coup, humanitarian crisis and the stalled implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. Yet another development deserves equal attention.

The rapid rise of the Arakan Army (AA) has fundamentally altered Myanmar’s strategic landscape and could reshape the geopolitical balance in the Bay of Bengal and the eastern Indian Ocean.

This is no longer simply another ethnic insurgency.

The Arakan Army has evolved into one of Myanmar’s most capable military organizations.

Across much of Rakhine State, it exercises effective territorial control while administering taxation, courts, local governance and public services. In many respects, it increasingly resembles a de facto governing authority rather than merely an armed resistance movement.

Its growing influence matters far beyond Myanmar’s borders.

Recent reports indicate that the Arakan Army has advanced to within only a few kilometres of Kyaukphyu, the location of one of China’s most strategically valuable overseas investments.

That development has profound implications not only for Beijing but also for Asean, India and the wider Indo-Pacific.

Kyaukphyu occupies a unique position in China’s long-term strategic planning.

China imports the overwhelming majority of its oil through the Strait of Malacca.

For decades, Chinese strategists have worried that this narrow maritime passage could become vulnerable during periods of great-power confrontation.

The so-called “Malacca Dilemma” has therefore shaped Chinese energy planning for almost two decades.

To reduce that vulnerability, Beijing invested billions of dollars in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative. Twin oil and natural gas pipelines now connect Kyaukphyu on Myanmar’s western coast directly to Yunnan Province.

Plans for a deep-sea port, railway connections and industrial zones would further transform Kyaukphyu into China’s principal gateway to the Indian Ocean.

These projects are not simply commercial investments.

They constitute one of China’s few viable alternatives to complete dependence on the Strait of Malacca.

Oil arriving from the Middle East and Africa can be unloaded directly at Kyaukphyu before travelling overland into southwestern China. The arrangement shortens transport times, diversifies supply routes and strengthens China’s overall energy security.

Yet infrastructure alone cannot guarantee strategic security.

Pipelines require stable governments. Ports require secure hinterlands. Railways require functioning political institutions capable of protecting long-term investments. Myanmar today offers none of these certainties.

Instead, the country remains locked in a protracted civil conflict involving the military government, numerous ethnic armed organisations and pro-democracy resistance forces.

Territorial control continues to shift across multiple theatres of conflict, with the Arakan Army emerging as perhaps the most successful of these organisations.

For Beijing, this creates an increasingly delicate balancing act.

China has traditionally maintained working relations with Myanmar’s military authorities while simultaneously preserving communication with several ethnic armed organisations operating near the China-Myanmar border.

Such pragmatic diplomacy allowed Beijing to protect trade, investment and border stability without becoming directly involved in Myanmar’s internal politics.

However, developments in Rakhine State have complicated that strategy considerably.

Reports that Chinese contractors and drone operators have assisted the junta’s efforts to defend Kyaukphyu suggest Beijing is becoming more directly invested in protecting infrastructure it considers indispensable to its national interests.

Whether these reports prove entirely accurate or not, they reflect growing international perceptions that China is increasingly concerned about the security of its investments.

Equally noteworthy has been the diplomatic context surrounding the arrest of Myanmar democracy activist and scholar Min Zin while visiting China.

The timing of Beijing’s public confirmation shortly before Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s official visit inevitably attracted international attention and prompted questions regarding China’s diplomatic calculations.

While the precise motivations remain known only to Chinese authorities, the episode underscores the increasingly complex nature of Beijing’s relationship with Myanmar’s military leadership.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, recent events suggest China is not managing Myanmar from an uncontested position of strength.

Rather, Beijing increasingly finds itself responding to rapidly changing realities created by actors beyond its direct control.

It requires cooperation from the junta while simultaneously recognising that several ethnic armed organisations now exercise effective authority over substantial territory.

This is diplomacy driven by necessity rather than dominance.

For Asean, these developments carry important implications.

Myanmar’s conflict is no longer solely a humanitarian or political challenge.

It has become an increasingly important geopolitical issue affecting maritime security, regional connectivity, energy resilience and investment confidence across Southeast Asia.

Should fighting spread further around Kyaukphyu, the consequences would extend well beyond Myanmar itself.

Major infrastructure projects linking the Bay of Bengal with southwestern China could face prolonged disruption. Regional shipping routes, supply chains and investor confidence would inevitably suffer.

Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia all depend upon uninterrupted maritime commerce. Asean’s prosperity has always rested upon open sea lanes, stable supply chains and predictable regional security conditions.

Any deterioration in western Myanmar therefore affects the broader strategic environment in which Asean operates.

Equally challenging is the political reality confronting Asean diplomacy.

The Five-Point Consensus remains the region’s agreed framework for addressing Myanmar’s crisis.

Yet implementation has made little progress. Meanwhile, organisations such as the Arakan Army continue consolidating territorial control and administrative capacity.

Without endorsing any armed actor, Asean must nevertheless understand the evolving realities on the ground.

Durable political settlements require engagement with all significant stakeholders capable of influencing stability. Ignoring emerging centres of authority risks rendering diplomatic initiatives increasingly detached from events inside Myanmar.

The rise of the Arakan Army therefore represents more than another battlefield development.

It illustrates how prolonged conflict gradually transforms political realities, creating new centres of power that eventually reshape regional strategic calculations.

For China, stability in Myanmar is essential for protecting its energy security and Indian Ocean access.

For India, developments in Rakhine State directly affect the Bay of Bengal and northeastern connectivity.

For Asean, Myanmar’s fragmentation increasingly challenges regional cohesion and centrality.

These interests need not be mutually exclusive.

All major stakeholders ultimately benefit from a peaceful, stable and politically inclusive Myanmar capable of reconnecting with regional economic integration.

The alternative is a prolonged conflict that encourages greater external intervention, weakens regional connectivity and undermines Asean’s long-standing vision of an open, peaceful and prosperous Southeast Asia.

The rise of the Arakan Army should therefore not be viewed merely as another episode in Myanmar’s tragic civil war. It marks the emergence of a new strategic reality that Asean can no longer afford to overlook.

Watching events unfold is no longer sufficient. Asean must develop a deeper understanding of Myanmar’s changing political geography, anticipate the broader regional consequences and prepare itself for a future in which the country’s internal conflict increasingly shapes the strategic balance of the entire Indo-Pacific.

* Phar Kim Beng is professor of Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) and director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS)

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.